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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee ) Case No. 20050553 
Vs. 
Tamara Rhinehart, Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(c) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. This appeal is taken under Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution, Sections 77-1-6(g) and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Court should review the trial court's decision to deny the Defendant's 
Motion to Quash Bindover from the preliminary hearing for allowing 
unreliable hearsay statements to be introduced against Defendant at the 
preliminary hearing as part of the State's case in chief The Standard of 
Review is the determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over for 
trial is a question of law. State v Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (2001) 
The trial court erred in allowing the State to prosecute the burglary and theft 
cases prior to the homicide case. The Standard of Review is Unfairly 
Prejudicial. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403. 
The Court should review for correctness the district court's legal conclusion 
that the challenged statements were admissible under exemptions to the 
hearsay rule. See State v Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The 
admissibility of evidence under the hearsay exceptions requires the 
application of facts to the legal requirements of the rule and that the trial 
court has some discretion in making this determination. See N.D. v A.EL 
2004 UT App 215, 11,73 P.3d 971. 
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IV. The Court should review the trial court's decision to deny the Defendant's 
motion for a new trial. The Standard of review is Abuse of Discretion. State v 
Torres-Garcia. 2006 UT App 48. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was originally charged with capital murder in the First District Court 
in Cache County, State of Utah. The defendant was also charged with a related second 
case on charges including burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a second degree 
felony. The Defendant had a jury trial where she was found guilty on both counts. The 
second case consisting of the burglary and theft charges are on appeal here. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case (State court case number 031101017) is related to the capital 
murder proceeding (State court case number 031100633). The two cases 
were consolidated for the purpose of the preliminary hearing 
proceedings. 
2. The case was prosecuted in the First District Court in Cache County, 
State of Utah. The case was heard in a preliminary hearing in the trial 
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court over multiple days in February, 2004. The trial court bound the 
matter over for trial. (R.87-93) (T. P.H. Vol 3 p 61) 
3. Defendant moved to quash bindover. (R.31 -48) 
4. The trial court orally denied Defendant's motion to quash the bindover 
at a hearing held May 10, 2004. The trial court entered a written 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH 
BINDOVER on June 3, 2004. (R.73-74) 
5. The trial court denied the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. (R.527-
28) 
6. Hearsay statements were allowed in the trial. (T. Trial Vol 2 pp 22-28) 
7. The Defendant's objections to the hearsay statements were overruled. 
(T. Trial Vol 2 pp 22-28) 
8. The Defendant was found guilty at the conclusion of the trial on January 
13,2005. (T. Trial Vol 3 pp 65-66) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The hearsay evidence admitted at preliminary hearing was a violation of Defendant 
Tamara Rhinehart's constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine. 
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The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. There was 
newly discovered evidence that was significant to the trial and potentially outcome 
determinative in the matter. 
The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motions regarding the order of her 
trials. The order of the trials was unfairly prejudicial towards the Defendant. 
The trial court erred in overruling the Defendant's objections to hearsay statements 
made during the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
At the preliminary hearing the State relied entirely on hearsay to support 
the charges in the present case: 
Craig Nicholls: 
Mr. Nicholls is the charged co-defendant in the aggravated murder case 
against defendant. He was charged as the principle actor and the actual assassin in 
relation to the aggravated murder. He is also alleged to be an accomplice in the 
present case, though he has never been charged. The Statement was taken 
subsequent to Mr. Nicholls entering a plea or guilty pursuant to a plea bargain that 
spared him the death penalty. (R.249-261) 
On November 12, 2003 Mr. Nicholls participated in an interview with 
police about the murder to which he had pleaded guilty. He also discussed the 
alleged burglary. The statement was recorded by a registered professional reporter, 
5 
though no attorney was present and no opportunity for cross-examination was 
provided. The interview transcript (hereafter "Nicholls Interview") was offered as 
State's Exhibit 26 at the preliminary hearing, and was admitted over defendant's 
numerous objections. The Nicholls Interview is 87 pages long. (R. 272-357) 
The trial court found Mr. Nicholls to be unavailable to testify at the 
preliminary hearing by way of his invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination. 
Mamie Christianson: 
The trial court admitted, over Defendant's objection, a partial transcript 
of a telephone interview of Mamie Christianson, by police, marked as State's 
Exhibit 29 (hereafter "Christiansen interview excerpt.") No claim is made that Ms. 
Christiansen was an actual witness to any burglary or any actions of the defendant. 
The Christianson interview excerpt simply makes statements of Ms. Christianson as 
to what admissions Rhinehart allegedly stated to her about being involved in the 
burglary. (R. 484-499) A summary of her testimony during trial is as follows: 
a. That she was the hairdresser/manicurist for the Defendant for a 
substantial period of time prior to the summer of 2003; 
b. That in the summer of 2003, Tamara Rhinehart made numerous 
statements to Ms. Christensen while Ms. Rhinehart was a client in 
Ms. Christensen's salon, to the effect that Tamara Rhinehart had 
stolen a safe from someone, in conjunction with her boyfriend, that 
UAJ.V/ p v W U U l V V/X O tV/CtXlJUg L1JX/ DCULV/ HCU^ UV/V-/11 dllV^lY LLJSX/ d V \ J l l l p l W Y 
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heist depicted in the film, "The Italian Job/' and that Ms. Rhinehart 
had received some cash money and/or some jewelry from the theft of 
the safe. (T. Trial Vol 2 pp 42-54) 
The government supplied discovery to the defense in this case in advance of the 
trial. As part of that discovery, the defense was supplied with a transcript of an interview 
between law enforcement officers and Mamie Christensen, in which she is first reporting 
to law enforcement her concerns about the Defendant herein, including reports about the 
theft of a safe and Tamara Rhinehart's alleged admissions about the same. The tape and 
the transcript of that recording simply stop. There is no summary, conclusion or 
"wrapping up" of the conversation by the officer and there is no official statement that 
the conversation is ending. It appears that the conversation may have ended without 
anyone making note of the fact, or that the tape ran out accidentally, or that the tape was 
deliberately shut off in the middle of the conversation. It is impossible to tell which from 
the tape itself. 
Toward the end of the conversation which defense did receive, the officers are 
requesting that Marnie Christensen wear a wire sound transmission device, and that she 
set up a conversation or conversations with Tamara Rhinehart, with police officers 
listening in on those conversations. By the point in time when the tape supplied in 
discovery stops, Mamie Christensen is resisting the officer's idea of wearing a wire and 
of speaking to the defendant. 
Counsel for the Defendant, prior to the burglary trial in question, specifically 
inquired of the prosecution whether or not Mamie Christensen had "worn a wire" and 
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spoken to the Defendant while being monitored by law enforcement. Eventually, counsel 
for the defense conveyed to the prosecution in correspondence their assumption that, 
since there was no recording of any such intercepted conversations, nor any police reports 
to the effect that such monitored conversations had occurred, no such conversations had 
taken place. The prosecution did not respond at all, one way or the other, to this letter 
from the Defense regarding their discovery assumptions in this case. Accordingly, 
Defendant went to trial in this matter based upon what had not been provided in 
discovery and based upon this correspondence to the prosecution confirming that Marnie 
Christensen had never "worn a wire," while speaking to the Defendant and that police 
had never monitored such conversation(s). 
Sue Davis: 
A hand-written statement of Sue Davis was admitted over Defendant's 
objection. (State Exhibit 26, P.H.) The statement relates that she went to dinner with 
Rhinehart, that she has subsequently been told that she was burglarized during the 
dinner, that Rhinehart was a party to the burglary, and what she believes was taken. 
(Preliminary hearing evidence from the responding police officers indicated that Ms. 
Davis was not aware, before being told by her sister, that she may have been the 
victim of burglary. She believed that she must have simply misplaced the items.) 
(T. Trial Vol 1 pp 112-114,121,125-126,133-136) 
The State relied entirely and solely on the above testimonial hearsay to 
support its case at the preliminary hearing. The bindover order was therefore based 
only on non-confronted hearsay. 
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A. The Right to Confront 
Rhinehart was denied her constitutional right to confront and cross examine the 
hearsay declarants at preliminary hearing pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1 Sections 12 and 13 of the Utah 
Constitution, and due process rights both state and federal in origin. On March 8, 2004 
the United States Supreme Court, in Crawford v Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, reaffirmed 
that the right of confrontation is plenary and allows for no exceptions where testimonial 
hearsay is implicated. 
In Crawford, a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court, stating that the 
ruling was "largely consistent with" precedent and "remaining faithful to the Framer's 
understanding/' held unequivocally that: 
Where testimonial evidence is at issue.. .the Sixth Amendmenl demands what the 
common law required: unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-examination. 
Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient 
to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: 
confrontation. 
Id. at 1374. In reaching the holding, the Court reviewed the full history of the 
confrontation right, determining that its significance cannot be understated. The Court 
reiterated that the particular value inherent in confrontation lies within its unique power 
to test the credibility and reliability of testimony. Thus, rules of evidence or other 
legislative or judicially-created doctrines developed to assess "reliability" and which may 
allow for the admission of testimonial hearsay, are superceded by the United States 
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Constitution and are nullity where testimonial hearsay is sought to be introduced against 
a criminal defendant: 
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to 
leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, 
much less to amorphous notions of "reliability.".... Admitting statements deemed 
reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be 
sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination. 
Id. at 1370. In fact, the Court held that, where a court finds reliability based upon factors 
such as the fact that a statement is made to police against penal interest, or that it was 
given under oath at a judicial proceeding, insult is added to injury, since uthe single 
safeguard missing is the one the Confrontation Clause demands." Id. at 1372. 
The absolute right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at a preliminary hearing 
has long been recognized in Utah. The most exhaustive examination of the right is found 
in State v Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). There, the State sought to proceed at a 
preliminary examination partly by way of an affidavit containing testimonial hearsay, 
citing to then-existing U.C.A. 77-15-19. The Utah Supreme Court held that a preliminary 
hearing is a critical stage in the criminal process, and requires the application of 
substantive and procedural constitutional rights, including especially the rights afforded 
under the Confrontation Clause. 
Our review of the nature and purpose of the preliminary examination illustrates the 
critical character of the proceeding in relation to various substantive rights of the 
defendant which are subject to infringement by the exclusion of certain procedural 
safeguards at this step in the criminal prosecution. Recognizing the "critical" 
character of this proceeding the Supreme Court has extended the right of counsel (as 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution) to [the preliminary 
hearing]... .The protections afforded by the right of confrontation at the preliminary 
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examination are equally important and so inter-related to the right of effective 
counsel and the presentation of a defense that they must be guaranteed the accused 
at the preliminary hearing. 
Id at 784-85, citing Coleman v Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969), United States v Wade. 388 
U.S. 218 (1967), and other federal cases which have been omitted. 
In so ruling, the Court in Anderson relied on historical and procedural 
considerations that mirror those expressed in Crawford. The holding in Anderson is 
founded on both State and Federal Constitutional principles. The fimdamental importance 
of the right of confrontation was tied inherently to other inimitable rights such as the right 
to counsel, the right to discovery, and ultimately the right to due process and a fair trial. 
If the preliminary hearing is to retain any meaningful significance in the criminal 
prosecution and provide an effective means of weeding out improvident 
prosecutions, the protections attendant the defendant's right to present an 
affirmative defense cannot be circumvented by allowing the prosecution to base its 
showing of probable cause on hearsay evidence.. ..The recognition of the right of 
confrontation at the preliminary examination merely demands the prosecution's use 
of hearsay evidence at the hearing may not circumvent the defendant's substantive 
rights to a fair trial, by denying the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses who offer testimony at the hearing. 
Id. at 786 (citations omitted.) 
In 1995 Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution was amended, adding 
language about the use of so-called "reliable hearsay" at preliminary examinations. In 
relation to the amendment, Rule 1102 was added to the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
purporting to allow "reliable hearsay" at the preliminary examination, and providing 
specific examples of what such hearsay might include. According to the Advisory 
Committee Note to Rule 1102, there was an intent in its passage of abrogating Anderson 
to the extent that its holding was inconsistent wit the new Rule. However, since Anderson 
11 
is based upon federal constitutional principles, which principles have primacy over any 
rule to be to the contrary, Anderson remains the law. To the extent that anything in the 
1995 amendment to Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution or Rule 1102 is 
inconsistent with Crawford, it is unconstitutional. Moreover, nothing in the Advisory 
Committee Note specifically related to the confrontation right holding in Anderson. 
Instead, the Note can be read as applying only to notion of "reliable hearsay," and stating 
that anything in Anderson that is inconsistent with those notions are abrogated, keeping 
intact Anderson's holding that confrontation rights apply at preliminary hearings. The 
reading of the Note and the purpose behind Rule 1102 is the most apt. It allows for an 
interpretation of the Rule that is constitutionally consistent with the Anderson conclusion 
that confrontation rights exist at preliminary hearings, and makes sense of the policy and 
purpose of Rule 1102: to expand the list of the kinds of "reliable hearsay" for admission 
at the preliminary hearing. In other words, the amendment to Article 1, Section 2 and 
Rule 1102 did nothing to undermine the legal fact that confrontation rights apply at 
preliminary hearings; it simply expanded, for the purpose of preliminary hearings only, 
the already existent, rule-created hearsay exceptions. 
The federal constitutional underpinnings of Anderson are also likely responsible for 
the fact that the Utah Supreme Court has maintained fidelity to the "critical stage" 
holding therein. This court declined the invitation of various amicus parties in State v 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1228 (1995) to overrule Anderson. 
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Should this Court disagree with defendant's argument that the holding in Crawford 
applies to the preliminary hearing in the present matter, the reasoning and basis for the 
holding should be considered to test the findings of "reliability" with regard to the 
specific hearsay admitted in the present case. For instance, Nicholls is, as the State 
acknowledges, an alleged accomplice in both the capital murder and the present charges. 
Nicholls was charged and putatively became an informant witness in exchange for his 
very life, perhaps the greatest incentive an informant can have to lie or to color his 
statements in favor of the prosecution The statements of such persons have long been 
considered to be inherently unreliable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Bruton v United 
States. 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Lilly v. Virginia. 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Cruz v New York, 
481 U.S. 186 (1987); Lee v Illinois. 476 U.S. 530 (1986). The Court in Lilly flatly held 
that "a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant... [is a] 
category of hearsay [that] encompasses statements that are inherently unreliable." 527 
U.S. 116, 130-131. Further, the Court noted the longstanding nature of the legal principle: 
"we have over the years 'spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable 
accomplices' confession that incriminate defendants." Id., citing Lee, Cruz, and Bruton. 
The Court in Crawford also specifically complained that state courts seemed to admit 
such testimony despite the fact that the Confrontation Clause "plainly meant to exclude" 
it. Crawford at 1371-72, citing many state court decisions. The Court commented that, 
[t]o add insult to injury, some of the courts that admit untested testimonial statements 
find reliability in the very factors that make the statements testimonial, ..." such as 
statements made under oath. Id. at 1372. 
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The very same factors were relied upon at the preliminary hearing below to admit 
the testimonial hearsay complained of. Crawford makes clear that, even if a reliability 
review were allowable, which it is not, the statements involved here are quintessentially 
unreliable. Admitting them into evidence violated defendant's federal and state due 
process rights, in addition to the infringement on her federal Sixth Amendment rights. 
Rule 1102 is not and cannot, under any constitutional interpretation, be read as a list 
of sufficient conditions indicative of reliability hearsay for the purposes of preliminary 
hearings. It cannot be that all that need be shown is that any one of the listed categories 
be applicable to the statement. Instead, the Rule can at most be read as a list of factors 
that, if a hearsay is otherwise not reliable, are necessary conditions to its admissibility at 
preliminary hearings. The statements at issue in the present case are quintessentially 
unreliable hearsay, and cannot be made reliable simply by the formalistic and categorical 
application of Rule 1102. 
(It is also worth noting that the passage of the amendment to Article 1, Section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution and the creation of Rule 1102 was solely in relation to the requests 
of victim rights advocates and in response to a stated desire to avoid "victims'5 having to 
testify needlessly. None of the declarants in the present case—especially the assassin and 
his accomplice—could remotely be characterized as "victims," in any sense.) 
C. Newly Discovered Evidence. 
A key witness in the prosecution of Defendant during the jury trial was Ms. Marnie 
Christensen. (T. Trial Vol 2 pp 42-55) Ms. Christensen's testimony against Ms. Rhinehart 
v/as the most significant testimony in support of conviction, for reason that Ms. 
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Christensen was the only person who could connect Ms. Rhinehart in any way with the 
crime in issue. No other physical evidence nor testimonial evidence in this case connects 
this defendant with this particular crime. In other words, but for the testimony of Ms. 
Christensen and but for the finding of the credibility of that testimony, neither conviction 
against Ms. Rhinehart on either count could be sustained. 
Further, the testimony of Ms. Christensen was the most critical testimony at trial to 
establish that a crime had even occurred. Absent the testimony of Ms. Christensen to the 
effect that Tamara Rhinehart had admitted being an accomplice to the burglary and an 
accomplice to the theft of the safe, there would not be sufficient evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a theft or burglary of the safe had ever occurred. (T. Trial 
Vol 2 pp 42-55) The victim of the crimes of conviction (Sue Davis) did not report a theft 
or loss of the safe until after the police contacted her with information from Ms. 
Christensen. Ms. Davis and members of her family believed the victim might simply 
have lost or misplaced the safe until hearing of the admission of Ms. Rhinehart to Marnie 
Christensen. In other words, absent the testimony of Ms. Christensen, and reliance on the 
credibility thereof, the State could not prove by necessary burden of proof even that a 
crime had been committed. 
It must be presumed that the lack of discovery regarding conversations which took 
place after Ms. Christensen supposedly agreed to the wire, and did wear the wire were 
not inculpatory as to Defendant, or, most certainly, reports of those conversations from 
law enforcement officers and recordings of those conversations would have been adduced 
at uiai . Diauy v Mctiyictlia, J /J U.d. OJ (l^OJJ 
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The evidence against the Defendant herein is highly circumstantial. In cases such as 
this, the very absence of inculpatory statements, taken under these circumstances, is 
exculpatory as to the Defendant, and as to her criminal case herein. 
D. The Order of Trials 
The Defendant strenuously objected, on a number of occasions, as to the order of 
trials between this case and the Defendant's capital murder case (Court Case Number 
031100633). (R.358-362). The trial court's decision that the order of trials herein was in 
the sole discretion of the prosecution, and that the prosecution could proceed to trial first 
in this burglary case constituted a substantial error and was prejudicial to the Defendant 
in terms of her ability to defend herself in this burglary action. 
Due to the order of trial in this case, and due to the pendency of the capital murder 
in which the government was seeking the death of Tamara Rhinehart, Ms. Rhinehart was 
precluded in cross-examination from probing the most fundamental factors of the 
circumstantial evidence in this case. She was compressed between the need to defend 
herself on the burglary charge on the one hand, and the need to avoid making a statement 
relevant to the death penalty in the murder case on the other hand. 
The fears of being cross-examined regarding circumstances and individuals closely 
related to the murder case precluded the defendant from taking the witness stand to 
defend herself in the burglary case. As a result, the jury was given, and could only be 
given, a tortured and incomplete explanation of how the investigation of the murder case 
let to the investigation of the burglary case. The question from the jury during 
deliberation regarding the circumstances surrounding the investigation, due to the proper 
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pre-trial ruling of the court limiting discussion of the murder investigation, could not 
appropriately be probed in the course of trial nor clarified for the jury. (R. 422-423) Rule 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence clearly states, "Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it 
has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by improper means.. .or otherwise 
causes the jury to base its decision on something other than the facts of the case." In State 
vJDeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the court found that although evidence may 
have probative value, the overwhelming probability of unfair prejudice and confusion of 
the issues submitted to the jury clearly affected the substantial rights of the defendant. 
(R.422-423) 
Most importantly, because of the Defendant's inability to discuss with critical 
witnesses Marnie Christensen, Craig Nicholls, and Jessica Goalan their personal 
involvement in the murder case, and/or their involvement in the investigation of the 
murder case, the Defendant was effectively denied her rights to confront and cross-
examine these witnesses as to facts crucial to the burglary defense. Therefore, during the 
trial, the Defendant was denied the same Constitutional rights of confront and cross-
examine that she was denied during the pretrial. The same argument and cases outlined 
above apply here as well. 
The order of the trials in this case was unfairly prejudicial to the Defendant because 
the jury was unable to focus on the facts of the case because Ms. Rhinehart was unable to 
fully cross-examine witness, nor testify on her behalf because of her fear of incriminating 
herself in the pending murder case. 
D. Hearsay Statements Made During the Trial 
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We have outlined above how the hearsay evidence introduced during the 
preliminary hearing denied the Defendant of her constitutional rights. Despite objections 
from the defense, the trial court allowed hearsay to be introduced during the trial as well. 
The issue at hand is whether the defense "opened the door" by questioning Detective 
Bennett on the subject of whether he had verified the existence of the safe. The Defense 
asked, "You didn't ask her whether there was anyone else who had any knowledge of 
whether a safe ever existed?" Detective Bennett answered, "Not to my knowledge." (T. 
Trial Vol 2 p 17). During redirect examination, the State took liberties to elicit hearsay 
statements that were made by other individuals on the argument that the "door had been 
opened." It is the Defense's stance that the line of questioning was in the context of 
talking or not talking with family members of the alleged victim, not to include the 
hearsay statements made by others. The State and court disagreed and ruled that the door 
had been opened sufficiently. (T. Trial Vol 2 pp 26-27) 
Allowing the hearsay into the trial was very prejudicial towards the Defendant. The 
alleged victim never reported a lost safe to the police or members of her family. It was 
only after the police came to her and asked her if she was missing a safe did she make 
any comment about even owning a safe. (T. Trial Vol 1 pp 112-114, 121, 125-126) Even 
after questioning, the alleged victim and her family said she probably had just misplaced 
the safe. (T. Trial Vol 1 pp 133-136) The only collaboration that there ever was a safe 
comes from hearsay statements made by Craig Nicholls in an interview which took place 
before the preliminary hearing. These statements were never cross-examined by the 
Defense, as they were denied this right in the preliminary7 hearing. Furthermore, Mr. 
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Nicholls was a hostile witness during the trial and flat out denied any knowledge of a 
burglary. The State never asked him about the existence of the safe during the trial, the 
alleged safe has never been recovered, and as far as we know, it never existed. The 
Defense's objection to the hearsay statements allowed into the trial is on record. (T. Trial 
Vol 2 pp 26-28) 
Without the hearsay statements, there would be no evidence of any burglary, and as 
a result no burglary case. Rhinehart was denied her constitutional right to confront and 
cross examine the hearsay declarants pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution, Article 1 Sections 12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution, 
and due process rights both state and federal in origin. On March 8, 2004 the United 
States Supreme Court, in Crawford v Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354. reaffirmed that the 
right of confrontation is plenary and allows for no exceptions where testimonial hearsay 
is implicated. The hearsay statements should never have been allowed into the trial 
The trial court obviously erred in their decision to allow the hearsay evidence under 
the weak argument that the Defense had "opened the door." Even if the Defense had 
"opened the door" as the State claims, Ihey didn't open the door for the Detective to 
testify about hearsay statements. If the door was opened, witnesses should have been 
called to testify to the existence of the safe, with the opportunity of cross-examination to 
test their reliability. Instead, we have testimony consisting of hearsay statements, which 
the Detective claims were made to him at an earlier time. Without the crucible of cross 
examination, there is no way to test the reliability of the hearsay statements. Mr. Nicholls, 
a prisoner with a pending murder case with the State seeking the death penalty, is the 
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primary witness to the existence of a safe. If anyone had motive to lie, especially in the 
light that the death penalty would be removed in exchange for their testimony, it would 
be Mr. Nicholls. Without the opportunity for cross-examination, and with the witness 
denying any knowledge of a burglary in their testimony during the trial, the reliability of 
these hearsay statements is surely in question. As we outlined in our previous arguments, 
the Defense must be given the opportunity for confrontation and cross examination for 
the very purpose of testing the reliability these statements. In Crawford, the Court 
reiterated that the particular value inherent in confrontation lies within its unique power 
to test the credibility and reliability of testimony. The trial court denied Ms Rhinehart her 
most basic, fundamental rights by allowing the introduction of the hearsay statements 
without the opportunity for confrontation. The Defense's objections should have been 
granted, and the hearsay statement's should never have been allowed to come in during 
the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in their denial to grant the Defendant's motion to quash 
bindover. The admission of the hearsay at the preliminary hearing in the present case was 
unconstitutional. The defendant was denied her constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine, and the hearsay in issue is unreliable. 
The trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to take the burglary case to trial 
before the capital murder case. The Defendant was denied her right to take the stand and 
to confront and cross-examine key witnesses because of the pending murder case. 
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The trial court erred in their denial to grant the Defendant's motion for a new trial. 
The admission of the hearsay statements, the order of the trials, and the admission of new 
evidence prejudiced the Defendant, and denied her of her rights to a fair trial. 
Wherefore the Defendant requests that the Appellate Court reverse the trial court's 
decision and: 
A. Grant the Defendant's motion to quash bindover. 
B. Grant the Defendant's motion for a new trial. 
C. Grant the Defendant's motion to have the capital murder case tried before the 
burglary and theft case. 
Furthermore, the Defense requests oral arguments in this case. 
Dated this i I day of March, 2006 
David M. Perry 
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER 
Case Nos. 031100633 
031101017 
Judge: Gordon J. Low 
The Court, after review and consideration of the Defendant's Motion to Quash, the 
State's Response to the Defendant's Motion to Quash, and the oral argument presented to 
the Court on May 10, 2004, now makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. On February 5, 6, 11, and 27, 2004, a preliminary hearing was conducted in the 
above entitled matter. 
2. On February 6, 2004, the State concluded its presentation of evidence. At the 
request of the defense so they would have additional time to present additional witnesses, 
the Court continued the hearing to February 11, 2004. 
3. On February 11th, prior to the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the State 
filed a Second Amended Information charging the defendant with one count of 
aggravated murder, one count of forgery, and four counts of communications fraud. The 
State requested the Court to bind the defendant over for trial on all six counts contained in 
the Second Amended Information in case #031100633 (North Logan homicide) and on all 
three counts in the Information in case #031101017 (the Providence burglary). 
4. On February 11, 2004, the defendant presented her case, and at the conclusion 
of the hearing, the Court bound the defendant over on the crime of criminal homicide, 
aggravated murder, a capital offense, finding that the crime was committed and that the 
defendant committed it. See Preliminary Hearing Transcript, vol. 3, p. 61. The Court 
withheld ruling on the bind over of the remaining counts and requested the State prepare a 
memorandum detailing what evidence had been presented during the preliminary hearing 
that supported the remaining charges contained in the Amended Information filed in case 
#031100633 and the Information filed in case #031101017. The Court provided time for 
the defendant to respond to the State's memorandum and set a hearing for February 27, 
2004, where the defendant could present any additional evidence or information to the 
Court. 
5. On February 13, 2004, the State filed its Post Preliminary Hearing 
Memorandum detailing the evidence presented by the State that supported each of the 
remaining counts which had not been bound over for trial. The defendant did not file a 
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response to the State's memorandum nor did the defendant call any further witnesses at 
the hearing held on February 27, 2004. 
6. On February 27, 2004, the Court found that probable cause was established and 
existed for each of the crimes charged in the remaining counts in both cases and that they 
were committed by the defendant. The Court bound over the defendant on the charges in 
both cases and required her to appear to answer to those charges before the district court. 
See Preliminary Hearing Transcript for Feb. 27, p. 46. 
7. On March 4, 2004, the defendant filed its Motion to Quash Bindover. On 
March 24, 2004, the defendant filed its supporting memorandum. On April 7, 2004, the 
State submitted its response to the defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover. 
8. During the preliminary hearing, the State presented testimony from Chief Kim 
Hawkes, Detective Shawn Bennett, and Detective Jim Williamson. Through these 
witnesses, the State provided direct testimony of the investigation of the death of Michael 
Brodrero. The evidence received and considered by the Court included: (1) Several 
pictures of the murder scene; (2) The Medical Examiner's report of examination of 
Michael Brodrero stating that the he died of gunshot wounds inflicted by another 
individual; (3) Applications for life insurance policies, made by the defendant via the 
internet, taken out in the name of the victim and listing the defendant as a beneficiary; (4) 
An application for life insurance on the victim submitted by the defendant to Shawn 
Iverson; (5) Voluntary statement of Shawn Iverson indicating that the defendant 
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submitted an application for life insurance on the victim; (6) Direct testimony that the 
signature on the application submitted by the defendant to Shawn Iverson was a forgery 
and there being a high probability that the signature was forged by the defendant; (7) 
Statement of Mamie Christianson, the defendant's hair dresser, made to the North Park 
Police Department, wherein Ms. Christianson gave an account of the admissions made by 
the defendant to her of the defendant's plans to kill Michael Boudrero and of her 
commission of a burglary of a safe containing money and jewelry; (8) Sworn witness 
statement of Sue Davis detailing that a safe was taken from her home in Providence, 
Utah, that contained $6,500 in cash and miscellaneous jewelry items; (9) Business records 
of Globe indicating communications from the defendant, wherein she requested actions 
with respect to life insurance policies on Michael Boudrero, including a time where, with 
the assistance of the defendant, Mr. Nicholls posed as Michael Boudrero and attempted 
to reinstate a policy that Mr. Boudrero had previously cancelled; and (10) Nicholls' Rule 
11 Statement, Nicholls'Intereview, and Goalen Interview which each describe in similar 
and extensive details the defendant's participation in acquiring insurance policies on 
Michael Boudrero, of planning a ruse to lure Mr. Boudrero out to a job site in North 
Logan where he would be killed by Nicholls, and of disposing of the evidence after the 
murder was completed. 
9. During the course of the Preliminary Hearing, the State offered and the Court 
received thirty-three exhibits. The defendant only objected to the admission of six of 
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these exhibits including: State's Exhibit #25 (Nicholls Interview); States Exhibit #24 
(Goalen Interview); State's Exhibit #23 (Nicholls Rule 11 Waiver/Statement); State's 
Exhibit 29 (Transcript of Mamie Chnstensen); State's Exhibit 31 (Globe Message 
Display) and State's Exhibit #33 (Globe Life Letter and Message Display). The rest of the 
remaining twenty-seven State's exhibits were offered and received by the Court without 
objection from the defendant. 
10. On August 14, 2003, Ms. Goalen was interviewed and admonished by 
Detective Jacobson to tell the truth and she was further placed under oath by Kelly L. 
Wilburn, a Registered Professional Reporter and the interview was transcribed verbatim. 
11. On November 10, 2003, Craig Nicholls pleaded guilty to Aggravated Murder, 
a capital felony and signed a document entitled "Notice of Plea Bargain Rule 11 
Waiver/Statement of Facts." With the assistance of Mr. Nicholls, this document was 
prepared by Mr. Nicholls' attorneys and the State. During the change of plea hearing, Mr. 
Nicholls was placed under oath and was read the document and confirmed each statement 
of fact contained in the document as being true and accurate. The Court accepted Mr. 
Nicholls7 plea finding that it was freely, knowingly and voluntarily made. 
12. On November 12, 2003, Craig Nicholls met with Detectives Bennett and 
Jacobson at the Logan City Police Department for an interview. Before the interview 
began, Detective Jacobson admonished Mr. Nicholls that he needed to be truthful and that 
if he wasn't, additional charges could be brought against him. Prior to the interview, 
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Rodney M. Felshaw, a Registered Professional Reporter, swore in Mr. Nicholls. 
13. The Court received State's Exhibits ##23, 24, and 25 finding they were reliable 
and admissible pursuant to Rule 1102 (b)(8)(a) and (b)(9) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
This Court finds that Nicholls' Rule 11 Statement was detailed, clear, under oath, and in 
exchange for a lesser penalty. Nicholls' Interview corroborates Nicholls' Rule 11 
Statement on most points, but in more detail, and is likewise under oath. This interview, 
which gives some additional detail to Nicholls' Rule 11 Statement, was also given after 
the sentencing and not before, so there was no consideration relative to whether or not it 
was in expectation of a lesser penalty. The detail found in Nicholls' Statement and 
Nicholls' Interview is remarkably consistent with the other evidence presented at the 
Preliminary Hearing and enhances its reliability. 
14. The Goalen Statement was received and corroborated with minute details 
which would only be known by someone with a relationship, which raises its reliability. 
It was likewise under oath and not in exchange for any immunity. It was corroborated by 
the Nicholls' Interview and Nicholls' Ride 11 Statement. It had internal and external 
corroboration, as well as the interview suggested by Detective Jacobson. State's Exhibit 
#1, Shaun Iverson 's Statement likewise has internal and external corroboration, as does 
the State fs Exhibit #26, Sue Davis' Statement. The reliability of both of those have been 
established consistent with Rule 1102 and independent of that and also with respect to the 
testimony of Detective Bennett and Williamson. All of the testimony from the witnesses 
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demonstrated a reliability and corroboration of the other hearsay statements received 
consistent with Rule 1102. 
16. On July 16, 2003, Marnie Christianson called the North Park Police 
Department and talked with Officer John Italasano. During this conversation she 
disclosed information regarding the defendant's involvement in the murder of Michael 
Boudrero. This tape recorded conversation was copied and forwarded to the defense on 
August 28, 2003. On February 5, 2004, Ms. Christianson signed an affidavit and affirmed 
that the contents of the transcript were an accurate account of the conversation she had 
with Officer Italasano. During the preliminary hearing, a partial transcript of this call was 
offered and received by the Court into evidence. Ms. Christianson had been subpoenaed 
to the preliminary hearing by the defendant and available to be cross examined on her 
statement during the proceedings. The defendant objected to the admission of the 
transcript, but never called Ms. Christianson to testify at the preliminary hearing. 
17. The defendant's objection to State's Exhibits #37 and #33 was based upon the 
theory that they would not be able to cross examine the caller that identified himself in the 
business record as Michael Boudrero. The defendant's objection was denied and the 
exhibits were admitted as business records. 
18. In addition to its prior determination of probable cause in both case 
#031100633 and case #031101017 finding that the crimes as charged were committed and 
that the defendant committed them, the Court additionally finds that the evidence, were it 
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segregated to exclude the following contested evidence: Nicholls Interview, State's 
Exhibit #25; Goalen Interview, State's Exhibit #25; and Nicholls Rule JI 
Waiver/Statement, State 's Exhibit #23, the evidence is still sufficient to establish probable 
cause that the crimes were committed in both case #031100633 and case #031101017 as 
charged and that the defendant committed them. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Court hereby makes the following conclusions of law: 
1. The hearsay evidence, presented during the preliminary hearing held in the 
above entitled matter, was properly admitted pursuant to Article 1 section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and Rule 1102 of the Utah Rule of Evidence. 
2. The hearsay evidence submitted by the State in each instance qualified under 
Rule 1102(b)(8), (9) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as it was either a written, recorded, or 
transcribed statement, given under oath or affirmation; or was given pursuant to a 
notification to the declarant that a false statement made therein is punishable; or the 
statement had other indica of reliability. 
3. The same right to confront and cross examine a witness that is provided for in a 
criminal trial does not exist in a preliminary hearing. The case of Craford v. Washington, 
2004 WL 413301 applies to trial proceedings and does extend the same rights of 
confrontation and cross examination to a preliminary hearing. 
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4. The doctrine of merger is inapplicable to both case #031100633 and case 
#031101017. Merger does not eliminate either of the aggravating factors found in Section 
76-5-202 (f) & (g)of the Utah Code, nor does it eliminate any of the charges in either 
case, as the statutory elements of any given charge is different than the elements required 
to prove any of the remaining charges. 
5. The defendant has failed to support with any law its argument that Section 76-5-
202(f) of the Utah Code is unconstitutional. This Court finds Section 76-5-202(f) to be 
constitutional as it gives adequate notice to enable ordinary people to understand what 
conduct is prohibited. This Court further concludes that Section 76- 5~202(f), (g) does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Accordingly, 
It is ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover is denied in 
whole. „
 y 
Dated this _J_ day of j j y ^ ^ , 2004 
Gordon 
District Court Judge 
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each side exercising four peremptories. Once that panel of 
eight is seated, we will then call six more potential jurors 
3| and from them select two alternate jurors, giving each side 
4| two peremptories. So stipulated? 
MR. WYATT: Yes. 
6 I MS. CORPORON: Yes, Your Honor. I assume we won't 
7 let the prospective jurors go until we've seated the ten? 
8 THE COURT: Absolutely. Everybody will stay in the 
9 courtroom until we've seated a full ten jurors. Throughout 
10I the proceedings the alternates will recognize that they're in 
11 an alternate position. I will remind them, however, that 
12 they may well be called upon to serve as jurors and should 
13 pay the same attention to the proceedings as the regular 
14 jurors. But at the conclusion of the presentation of the 
15 entire case, after closing arguments, the alternates will be 
16 released unless they've been asked to serve as a member of 
17 the final panel. 
18 There are two motions pending before the court filed by 
19 the defense. One is a motion, and I want to get the exact 
20 style of it. An objection to order of trials. I just 
21 received a moment ago Ms. Corporon's original reply, which I 
22 understand was faxed to the court yesterday but I did not 
23 have an opportunity to see it. I've just reviewed it this 
24 morning. This motion in various forms has been argued a 
25} number of times in prior proceedings and we addressed it just 
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1 briefly in chambers before coming into open court today. 
2 1 The court is prepared to deny the motion, finding 
3 specifically that the state has the right to proceed in the 
4 fashion and order which it has chosen to proceed. And that 
5 the concerns raised by the defense, though not 
6 inconsiderable, nevertheless the state has the right to 
7 proceed. And doing otherwise would create in this court's 
8 mind an artificiality at the request of the defense imposed 
9 upon the prosecution. 
10 The second motion is a motion in limine relative to 
11 certain evidence that may be approached in this case, 
12 specifically relative to two witnesses, the testimony of Mr. 
13 Nicholls and Ms. Goalen, which is anticipated to be presented 
14 by the state. The defense has asked that no reference be 
lb made in opening statement or in examination by the state of 
16 these two witnesses relative to the charges against the 
17 defendant of capital murder, which that trial is pending in 
18 April. 
19 The state has acquiesced in that response, suggesting 
20 that that's appropriate. But they anticipate that through 
21 either cross-examination or case presentation that that door 
22 may well be opened. Should it be opened, then the state 
23 would have the right to address the issues. I think both 
24 parties, at least to a limited degree, would acknowledge 
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1 Q. Didn't ask further about the safe? Where she got it? 
2 A. Not at that time, no. 
3 Q. You didn't ask when she'd bought it? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. You didn't ask at that time about who had been around the 
6 house in the months preceding that? 
7 1 A. We did ask if there was anyone that she may have 
8 suspected that could have committed a crime like this or 
9 steal money from her safe. 
10 Q. Let me ask you to respond to my question. You didn't ask 
11 her whether or not there had been other people who had access 
12 to the house? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. You didn't ask her who might have keys to the house? 
lb A. We may have. 
16 Q. You don't recall, though? 
17 A. I don't recall. 
18 Q. It's not in the report anywhere that would help refresh 
19 your recollection that you asked that, correct? 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. You didn't ask her whether there was anyone else who had 
22 any knowledge of whether a safe ever existed? 
23\ A. Not to my knowledge. 
24 Q. You never determined that there is another person on this 
25 planet that1 ever saw a safe in the possession of Sue Davis, 
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correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You didn't know, I take it, because you didn't ask then, 
4I that all of the work you heard about, that was testified 
5 about yesterday, was done on that house in previous months? 
6| A. That's correct. 
Q. I take it, because you didn't ask and didn't know, that 
other people had keys and had been taking care of pets and 
9| things in that -apartment? 
10 A. That's correct. 
11 Q. Did you ask whether or not an. insurance claim had ever 
12 I been made? 
A. We didn't. 
14 1 Q. To your knowledge none has? 
15 A. To my knowledge none has. 
16 MR. WILLIAMS: Nothing further. Well, I'm sorry. 
17 Q. (BY MR. WILLIAMS) There were some exhibits yesterday 
18 that were admitted. They were photographs? 
19 A. Correct. 
20 Q. They have been marked as state's four, two and one. Are 
21J you familiar with those photographs? 
A. I am. 
23 1 Q. Do you know who took them? 
24 A. I took them. 
25 Q. When did you take them? 
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A. I took them last Friday. 
Q. hast Friday you took pictures for the firsr time of t m s 
house? 
A. Yes. 
MR. WILLIAMS:: Nothing further. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, WYATT: 
Q. Detective, you were asked a question, and I didn't write 
91 down the exact words of the question, but it was to the 
10 effect did you verify with anybody that they had seen this 
11 safe to prove the existence of the safe and your answer was 
12 what? 
13 A. Could you rephrase that. 
14 Q. You were asked about whether or not you had verified with 
15 anybody that they had seen this safe. I believe your answer 
16 was that you had not? 
17 A. I had not. Myself nor Detective Jacobson. 
18 Q. Your answer to that question, does that relate to after 
19 the report or at any time? 
20 A. At any time. 
21 Q. Had you ever talked to Marnie Christianson about that? 
22 A. No. I've never spoken to Marnie Christianson. 
23 Q. Jessica Goalen? 
24 A. Jessica Goalen was asked about the safe at a later time, 
25 yes. 
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Q„ Craig Nicholls? 
A, Yes. Craig Nicholls was asked about the safe a't a later 
time . 
4I Q. Okay. So who have you spoken to, then, that has verified 
5| that the safe existed? 
A. 1 need to make a correction. Craig Nicholls was spoken 
to at an earlier time concerning the safe. But the only 
8 I people that 1 spoke to concerning the safe would have been 
9 Sue Davis and Geraldine Thomas. 
1 0 J MR. WYATT: May we approach for a moment? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
12I (Sidebar, not reported.) 
13 Q. (BY MR. WYATT) Did you talk to Craig Nicholls about a 
14 safe? 
15 I A. Yes, I did. 
Q. When did that happen? 
17I A. I don't recall the exact date, but I can look through the 
18 paperwork on my desk and tell you. 
19 Q. Who was present? 
20 I A. Myself, Detective Jacobson and our court reporter. 
Q. Did he tell you anything that would lead you to believe 
whether or not Sue Davis had a safe? 
23 I A. Yes. 
24 Q. And what was that? 






















to to retrieve the safe. 
Q. And what did he describe? 
A. He described coming into the valley. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I would object on hearsay at this 
point in time. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q. (BY MR. WYATT) Go ahead. 
A. He described coming into the valley. He described the 
Sear's store which is located down by Macey's at the south 
end of Logan. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. Nonresponsive . I think 
he was asking about what he said about a safe. 
THE COURT: That's correct, Mr. Wyatt. 
MR. WYATT: I think he's answering that. 
THE COURT: I think the issue Mr. Williams raises on 
hearsay restricts, because of the nature of the question and 
what led to the question, the answer is relative to the safe, 
not other perhaps unrelated matters. 
MR. WYATT: I think he's describing where it was. 
THE WITNESS: I can answer it differently. 
Q. (BY MR. WYATT) Go ahead. 
A. He described that he was to go into a home because there 
was an aunt of Tamra Rhinehart who possessed a safe with some 
money in that safe. That he would go into that home to take 
that safe out while Tamra Rhinehart took the family members 
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to lunch or dinner. 
Q. Did you talk to anybody else that told you about a safe? 
A. I talked to Jessica Goalen. 
Q. Ana did she say anything to you that caused you to 
believe whether or not there was a safe in the possession of 
Sue Davis? 
A. She did not know --
MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. Hearsay. 
9| THE WITNESS: -- who the safe belonged to. 
10 | THE COURT: Just a moment. The answer may be 
11 j hearsay. The problem is it wasn't responsive to your 
12 | question. 
13| Q. (BY MR. WYATT) let me ask the question again. Did 
14I Jessica Goalen tell you anything, yes or no? 
15j A. Yes. 
161 Q. That led you to believe whether or not Sue had a safe? 
17 | A. I'm not sure how to answer that. Jessica knew of a safe, 
18| but Jessica did not know who the safe belonged to, 
9I Q. Okay. How did you draw any connection at all between 
20 what Jessica told you? 
21 A. From collecting the conversations with Marnie 
22 Christianson, Craig Nicholls and Sue Davis, Geraidine Thomas 
23 and Jessica Goalen. 
24 Q. Anybody other than Jessica Goalen and Craig Nicholls that 
25 talked to you about a safe? 
Volume 2 - Page 23 
A. Besides Mamie Ctristianson, no. 
MR. WYATT: All right. That's all that I have about 
the safe. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILLIAMS: 
Q. Detective, let me clarify in case I confused anything. 
Let me make sure I understand you correctly. You went to 
Gerry's house to talk to Gerry and Sue Davis with the belief 
in your mind that you knew about a safe? 
10 I A. Correct. 
11 Q. You never had an opportunity, nor took any opportunity 
12 before you went there on November 19th to Gerry's house, to 
13 J otherwise verify that the safe had ever existed? 
14 I A. Prior to wnen? 
15 Q. When you talked to Gerry and Sue. 
16 A. Could you repeat that. 
17 J Q. You had in your mind that there was a safe and that came 
from statements of other people as you have just testified 
191 about? 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. Jessica Goalen? 
22 I A. Correct. 
Q. Who never told you she saw any safe? 
A. Correct. 
25 I Q. Marnie Christiansen? 
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A. Correct. 
Q. wno never told you she saw any safe? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And as you've said, Craig Nicholls? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Based on those statements, you went to Sue Davis and 
Gerry's house to talk to them about what in your mind you 
believed to be a crime that they were a victim of? 
A. Correct. 
10I Q. And you never have been able to verify with any person, 
11 including Gerry Thomas, the existence of a safe? 
12 I A. Correct. 
Q. Nc family member has ever told you they had seen a safe? 
14 j A. Correct. 
15 Q. No people who had access to that apartment and live in 
16 and about Sue Davis's life have ever confirmed to you that 
1^ there was a safe? 
16 A. Correct. 
19 MR. WILLIAMS: Nothing further. 
2 0 THE COURT: Mr. Wyatt. 
2 1 I FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WYATT: 
Q„ Did Craig Nicholls tell you about the safe prior to youi 
24 1 visit with Sue Davis or after? 
25 A. It was prior to. 
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Q. And the information you obtained from the other 
individuals, was that before or after? 
A. The information from Marnie Christianson was before. The 
information from Jessica Goalen was after. 
Q. After you were told by -- you've been a detective, a 
poLice officer, for how long? 
A. Seven years. 
8 I Q. After somebody told you that they had stolen a safe, 
9 described it, and then you went and verified that somebody 
10 told you about the safe, that they had it stolen from them, 
11 did you feel the need to go out and investigate further about 
12 whether or not the safe existed? 
13 A. The time period, five months, I didn't feel it necessary 
14 as far as with this particular case. 
15 Q. Was there any question in your mind? 
16 A. No question in my mind. 
17 MR. WILLIAMS: Objection. Conclusory. 
18 THE COURT: Whether there's a question in his mind, 
19 what's the relevance of that, Mr. Wyatt? 
20 MR. WYATT: It keeps being asked did you verify 
21 I whether the safe existed. 
THE COURT: The answer is yes or no. I'm going to 
231 sustain the objection. 
24 Q. (BY MR. WYATT) You took some pictures of the home last 
25 week, is that correct? 
Voli 
A. Yes. 
2 I Q. That was in anticipation of what? 
3 A. Of this trial. 
4 MR. WYATT: All right. I don't have 
5 J MR. WILLIAMS: Nothing further, Your Honor. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. WYATT: I'm not sure if my next witness is here. 
If I could have a moment? 
10j THE COURT: We'll take a brief recess in 
11 anticipation of the next witness. Ladies and gentlemen, I 
12 have to give you again the admonitions from the past. I'll 
13 remind you not to discuss the case or anything about it 
14 amongst yourselves or with anyone else. Do not allow anyone 
15 to discuss it in your presence. We'll be in recess. 
16 (Short recess.) 
17 (In chambers.) 
18 THE COURT: For introduction purposes, we had a 
19 discussion at the bench relative to the line of questioning 
20 to be pursued by Mr. Wyatt. Mr. Williams had a concern. Go 
2 l ahead. 
22 MR. WILLIAMS: Just that we put on the record that 
23 at the point -- put in the present record that reflects 
24 counsel approaching the bench and the discussion there was 
25 whether or not it would be appropriate for Mr. Wyatt to 
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elicit hearsay statements that were made by other individuals 
on the argument that the door had been opened. Such a tactic 
was based on questioning that was done by me of Detective 
Bennett on the subject of whether he had verified the 
existence of the safe. 
An objection was entered by counsel fcr the defendant: to 
proceeding in such a fashion on the argument that the 
entirety of the questioning that was done by Mr. Williams of 
Mr. Bennett was in the context of talking or not talking with 
other family members, et cetera. That there wasn't a 
reasonable inference that the question led -- could be 
related to the hearsay statements that were made by others. 
The state obviously disagreed with that, and so did the 
court, ruling that the door had been opened sufficiently by 
my line of questioning to then proceed -- for Mr. Wyatt to 
proceed to ask Detective Bennett about what in fact the other 
three hearsay witnesses had declared, and I suppose the 
timing of those statements. 
I hope the record is otherwise clear and preserves, in 
terms of our objections that were made, as to each of those 
other three hearsay declarant statements being entered. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wyatt, any further comment on the 
report as to what occurred at the bench? 
MR. WYATT: The state's position was that the 
defense asked the question of Detective Bennett if he 
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verified with any other person the existence o£ the safe and 
2| that that gave us the right to ask that question. 
3| THE COURT: I think both of you have fairly 
4 | reiterated the discussion at the bench. The line of 
5 questioning was whether or not there was any intrinsic 
6 evidence of the existence of the safe at all among anybody, 
7 not just family members. So the door was sufficiently opened 
8 to allow the state to proceed with proof as to the existence 
9 of the same other than the victim1s statement. So that was 
10 the basis for the ruling. I think that pretty well covers 
11 it. Ms. Corporon? 
12 MS. CORPORON: I think that recaptures it. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else we need to worry 
14 about today before proceeding? 
15 MS. CORPORON: Not of a legal nature that I can 
16 think of. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MS. CORPORON: Just waiting for people to get 
19 through the canyon, I guess. 
20 THE COURT: The canyon is bare today. 
21 (Open court.) 
22 THE COURT: Do you want the witness brought in now? 
23 MR. WYATT: I do. I'd like him in here so the jury 
24 doesn't see him come in in shackles. 
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